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Brooks: Property - Implied Warranties - Partial Death of Caveat Emptor in

PROPERTY-IMPLIED WARRANTIES-Partial Death of Caveat Emptor in Wyoming. Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975).

The subject of this note, Tavares v. Horstman,' is
another of the recent nationwide decisions doing away with
the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale of new
residential housing. The defendant, Tavares, a land developer and builder, sold the plaintiffs a tract of land. The defendant then built a house on the land for the plaintiffs under
an oral contract. This transaction carried with it no express
warranties. Less than a year later the septic tank system
backed sewage into the plantiff's basement. The defendant
was informed of this situation, but his attempts to fix the
septic system were ineffective. The plaintiffs hired an experienced septic contractor to rebuild the septic system. The
contractor determined that the system used by the defendant
was not adequate to serve a home the size of plaintiff's.
Plaintiffs sued Tavares for damages.2
The Wyoming Supreme Court was presented with the
choice of adopting a rule of implied warranty or adhering
to the doctrine of caveat emptor. The court held the rule
of caveat emptor does not apply to the sale of new residential
housing, and that there was an implied warranty running
from vendor-builder to vendee. Furthemrome, the court
held damages were recoverable for negligent design and
construction.8
CAVEAT EMPTOR-A TREND TOWARD ABROGATION

The common law rule of caveat emptor has long governed the sale of a dwelling.' This concept presupposed an
arms-length transaction with both parties standing in an
equal bargaining position. A buyer was presumed to have
had an opportunity to inspect a dwelling and therefore know
of existing defects. The vendor was not liable for defects
Copyright@ 1976 by the University of Wyoming

1. Tavaree v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975).
2. Id. at 1277.
3. Id. at 1276.
4. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim--Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931);
Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the
Rule, 14 VAD. L. Ray. 541 (1961). Both of these articles give an excellent
history of the caveat emptor doctrine.
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found after the sale. After World War II, the construction
industry took on an assembly line countenance. The equal
bargaining positions of the parties disappeared, negating
one of the underlying premises of caveat emptor. The buyer
was presented with a take-it or leave-it proposition with little
or no opportunity to adequately inspect the dwelling. This
inability to inspect was caused by the concealed nature of
much of the new construction, as well as the complexity of
the heating, plumbing, and wiring systems. While it may
have been evident to the buyer that he was no longer dealing
with an equal, but instead, doing business with a construction
company, the courts still refused to abandon the caveat emptor
doctrine. In one such Ohio case, Shapiro v. Kornicks,5 the
plaintiff complained of a leaky basement, crumbling front
steps, cracked door, and other defects. The court, feeling
bound by prior decisions, rejected an implied warranty.
Decisions like Shapiro were numerous,' and as recently as
1972 an Ohio court continued to support caveat emptor' One
court's argument for the adherence to the doctrine stated:
Were plaintiffs successful under the facts presented to us, an element of uncertainty would pervade
the entire real estate field. Real estate transactions would become chaotic if vendors were subjected to liability after they had parted with ownership and control of the premises.... The rule which
we impose in the present action works no harshness
on the purchasers of real estate. Plaintiffs had an
opportunity to protect themselves by extracting
warranties or guarantees from the defendant .... 8
In the last 20 years, some courts have recognized that
the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale of new housing has
become outmoded. Equal bargaining power no longer exists
and the vendee is at the mercy of the builder-vendor. As a
result, courts began forming remedies to help the vendee
and to equalize the positions of the parties. Foremost among
5. Shapiro v. Kornicks, 103 Ohio App. 49, 124 N.E.2d 175, 17-7 (1955).
6. Dennison v. Harden, 29 Wash. 2d 243, 186 P.2d 908, 912 (1947); Steiber
v. Palumbo, 219 Ore. 479, 347 P.2d 978 (1959). See Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d
883, 419 (1969), for a further list of cases adhering to the caveat emptor
doctrine.
7. Benson v. Dorger, 33 Ohio App. 2d 110, 292 N.E.2d 919, 922 (1972).
8. Levy v. C. Young Constr. Co., 26 N.J. 330, 139 A.2d 738, 740 (1958).
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9
these remedies are (1) the implied warranty of habitability
and (2) negligence in the construction of the house.1" The
implied warranty theory imposes a contract between buyer
and seller that the dwelling is built in a workmanlike manner and is suitable for habitation.

The negligence theory has been used by courts to impose
liability on the seller for personal injuries resulting from
faulty design and construction as well as for property damage. 2 This theory adopts the position of MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., t"which made the manufacturer responsible
for injuries to third parties resulting from eminently dangerous defects.
Although only a minority of state supreme courts have
discarded the caveat emptor doctrine, 4 those recently having
occasion to review the problem have almost uniformly rejected it. 5 The motivating force behind these courts' departures
from caveat emptor is the realization that the doctrine is
an anachronism which is totally unfair to the vendee. The
Supreme Court of Texas has even suggested the old doctrine
hurts the builder-vendor:
9. Bethlamy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
10. Rogers v. Scyphers, 251 S.C. 128, 161 S.E.2d 81 (1968); Shipper v. Levitt
& Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
11. Thies v. Heuer, 280 N.E.2d 300, 304 (Ind. 1972).
12. Westwood Dev. v. Esponge, 342 S.W.2d 623, 628 (Tex. Cir. App. 1961).
13. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
14. The Wyoming Supreme Court indicates that a majority of jurisdictions
have accepted the implied warranty doctrine over caveat emptor. Tavares
v. Horstman, supra note 1, at 1282. However, the commentators agree
that only a minority of states have rejected the caveat emptor doctrine.
McNamara, The Implied Warranty In New House Construction Revisited,
8 REAL EsT. L.J. 136 (1975); Williams, Development In Actions For Breach
of Implied Warranties of HabitabilityIn the Sale of New Houses, 10 TULSA
L.J. 445, 452 (1975); Note, Real Property-Implied Warranty of Workmanlike Quatty In New Housing Sales: New Protection for the North
Carolina Home Buyer, 53 N.C. L. RFv. 1090, 1091 (1975); Note, Elderkin
v. Gaster-The Pennsylvania Experience With Implied Warranties In
Sales of New Homes, 47 TEMPLE L.Q. 172 (1973). Twenty-two states have
so far rejected the old doctrine. See note 15 for a list of these jurisdictions.
15. Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So. 2d 313 (1971) ; Wawak v. Stewart,
247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc.,
269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1968); Carpenter v. Donohue,
supra note 9; Vernalli v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Supp. 476, 266 A.2d 200
(1970); Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla.1972); Bethlamy v. Bechtel,
aupra note 9; Weck v. A:M Sunrise Constr. Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 383, 184
N.E.2d 728 (1962); Thies v. Heuer, supra note 11; Crawley v. Terhune,
437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. App. 1969); Weeks v. Slavic Builders, Inc., 24 Mich.
App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503 (1970); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479
S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1970); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., supra note 10;
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[Caveat emptor] does a disservice not only to the
ordinary prudent purchaser but to the industry
itself by lending encouragement to the unscrupulous, fly-by-night operator and purveyor of shoddy
work.1
Possibly underlying these courts' holdings and thereby
the demise of caveat emptor are several socio-economic theories. One such theory is what Morris in his treatise on torts
refers to as risk-bearing. When equal bargaining power
was present and neither party in a superior position, both
buyer and seller were equally able to bear the risks of faulty
construction. After the shift in bargaining power occurred,
the risk-bearing ability also shifted. A construction company could bear the loss much easier than one homeowner.
The company could prepare for this loss by adding additional
costs to other homes sold and in that way pass the loss on
to other buyers. A second theory would place liability on
the party who can inspect the premises at a lower cost."s
Under this theory, a construction company, or possibly any
builder, would be able to inspect the premises at a lower
cost and more effectively. A builder should be in a position
to inspect as work develops while a buyer can inspect only
a finished house. Any detailed inspection by the buyer would
u sually necessitate unreasonable costs to reach the area he
wished to view. One final theory, which must necessarily
follow the cost-inspection analysis, would impose liability On
the party most able to avoid the loss. The builder, due to
his- ability to inspect the premises and his own expertise,
would be in a better position to avoid any future trouble.
While these theories are seldom, if ever, mentioned, they
give some further explanation for the downfall of caveat
emptor.
Hartley v. Ballou, 20 N.C. App. 493, 201 S.E.2d 712 (1974); Vanderschrier
v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957); Jones- v. Gatewood,
381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d
792 (1970); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d
803 (1967); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); Rothberg v.
Olenik, 128 Vt. 295, 262 A.2d 461 (1970); House v. Thorton, 76 Wash. 2d
428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969) ; Padula v. J. J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29,
'298 A.2d 529 (1973).
16. Humber v. Morton, supra note 15, at 562.
17. MORRIS ON TORTS 17 (1953).
18. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAw § 3.6, at 50 (1972).
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Tavares DECISION

The Wyoming Supreme Court was very impressed with
the logic of the current trend of judicial thought relative
to sales of new housing. The court emphasized the outdated
nature of caveat emptor 19 and its declining usefullness in
the present day. The court went on to say, "It ought to be
an implicit understanding of the parties that when an agreed
price is paid that the home is reasonably fit for the purpose
for which it is to be used-that it is reasonably fit for habitation."2 From this reasoning the court held that in sales
of new residential housing a builder-vendor impliedly warrants that the dwelling is constructed in a workmanlike
manner and is fit for habitation by the vendee. Although
the holding is limited to new housing, the court said that
the boundaries of implied warranties may be adjusted at
another time."' The significance of the Tavares decision
should not then be limited to the court's narrow holding.
APPLICATION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF

Tavares

Nonbuilder-vendor: Tavares presently applies only to
the builder-vendor. A question arises as to the liability of
a nonbuilder-vendor of new housing. In other areas where
implied warranties are used, such as the Wyoming Mobile
Home Act,2" it is obvious that the dealer as well as the
manufacturer is liable. In Smith v. Old Warson Development
Co.,"3 a nonbuilder-vendor situation did occur. Several
months after purchasing a new house, plaintiff discovered
spaces between the baseboards and the floor, cracks in the
walls, and a sinking foundation. The defendant was the
vendor of the house, the construction having been done by
an independent contractor. The court held that plaintiff
could recover on an implied warranty of fitness for habita19. Tavares v. Horstman, supra note 1, at 1278. The court quotes from CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 136 (1924): "A rule which in its origin

20.
21.
22.
28.

was the creation of the courts themselves, and was supposed in the making
to express the mores of the day, may be abrogated by the courts when
the mores have so changed. ..
Id. at 1279.
Id. at 1282.
WYo. STAT. § 35-550 (Supp. 1975).
Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., supra note 15, at 797.
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tion. From an economic risk-bearing point of view this is
a logical result. Just like the builder-vendor, a nonbuilder
can bear the risk and spread the loss much easier than a
homebuyer. The answer is not so clear if a cost of inspection
analysis is used. A vendor may not be able to inspect the
premises at a lower cost than the buyer. The Smith case
probably presents the most common nonbuilder-vendor situation, that being the vendor hiring an independent contractor.
Under normal circumstances the vendor would still be in
close proximity to the on-going construction. The nonbuildervendor would be able to inspect the premises as work proceeded and therefore at a lower cost than the buyer. The
ability-to-avoid-the-loss theory, relative to Smith, would also
place liability with the seller because of his superior ability
to inspect.
The related implied warranty theories and the Smith
decision would strongly support the imposition of liability
on the nonbuilder-vendor. While the socio-economic theories
seem to be inconsistent, the risk-bearing approach would give
a buyer a cause of action. For these reasons caveat emptor
should not protect a nonbuilder-vendor.
Subsequent purchaser: If the plaintiffs, in the Tavares
situation, had sold the house three months after purchase
to another buyer and the septic system had failed, a restrictive application of the court's holding would imply no warranty. Such transactions occur frequently. When a subsequent purchaser does eventually sue the builder-vendor, the
court must decide whether or not to extend the warranty.
All three socio-economic theories would support extension of
the warranty to the subsequent purchaser. This buyer is no
more able to bear the risk of loss, inspect the premises at
a lower cost, or avoid the damage than was the original
purchaser. The builder-vendor has the same ability to protect himself as he always had. From this point of view a
subsequent purchaser should be in the same position as the
original purchaser so long a the warranty has not expired.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol11/iss2/11
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The resolution of the subsequent purchaser problem
should be determined by the length of the warranty. As
long as the warranty is still in effect the home owner, whether he is the original purchaser or not, should be able to
enforce it. The length of the warranty may be judged by
the minimum life of the faulty component part, as the court
in Tavares suggests.2 4 Statutory definition of the length of
warranties, delineating who will be subject to and benefit
by the warranty, may be another alternative. Such a statute
would be more certain and easier to apply than a case-bycase judicial approach necessitated by the absence of a statute. Whichever of these two approaches is used, the liability
of the builder-vendor should not be limited by the fortuitous
sale of a faulty dwelling to an unlucky third party. Finally,
it must be remembered, that regardless of the applicability
of the implied warranty to the subsequent purchaser, there
remains a remedy in tort for injuries resulting from eminently dangerous conditions.25
Present applicability of caveat emptor: The doctrine of
caveat emptor is still a viable defense to a sale of an older
house. In Wyoming many houses are still built by individuals
not concerned with a residential project. Equal bargaining
power and ability to inspect the premises may be present,
indeed the construction may be directed by the buyer. Even
with all the reasons for caveat emptor present, the court in
Tavares has held this defense no longer valid.2 8 A builder
faced with this situation may have several arguments in
his favor.
A builder may argue that in this limited situation
caveat emptor is applicable. Secondly, he may argue contributory negligence on the part of the buyer. Finally, a builder
in this situation should use a total disclaimer of all warranties. He would then urge the court to uphold this disclaimer because of the equal bargaining position of the
parties. The risk-bearing doctrine would recognize that
24. Tavares v. Horstman, supra note 1, at 1282.
25. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra note 13, at 1053.
26. Tavares v. Horstman, supra note 1, at 1282.
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neither party is better able to bear the loss, so that in this
situation the buyer must accept the risk.
While these arguments are valid, there are several
equally as valid opposing arguments. There is a question
as to when there is actually ever equal ability to inspect
the premises. The builder in the rural situation many times
is actually in a better position to inspect the house and therefore avoid the loss. Furthermore, if it is argued that a buyer
deserves less protection in rural areas, it is possible that
he already gets less protection with the absence of housing
codes and building inspectors. The question of whether or
not to apply Tavares in the rural situations is a difficult
one.
Landlord-tenant after Tavares: Just as in the construction field, landlord-tenant is governed by caveat emptor.7
Courts have tried on a case-by-case approach to make exceptions to the doctrine.2" In the last 15 years, a minority of
states have rejected caveat emptor in favor of an implied
warranty of habitability.2" Nevertheless, as in the construction field, the majority of jurisdictions still have not yet
accepted the implied warranty theory.
The question, then, is if the Wyoming court was now
presented with a landlord-tenant case, would the court discard caveat emptor here also? Both landlord-tenant and new
house construction are similar in that they concern the use
of a dwelling. The current trend of the law in both areas
is solidly away from caveat emptor3 Finally, the courts
that have rejected this doctrine point to its outdated nature
27. Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of
the Past With Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225 (1969).
28. Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (1922). There is no caveat emptor
rule in the short-term lease of a furnished dwelling.
29. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276
A.2d 248 (1971); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Il. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d
208 (1972); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973); Mease
v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973).
30. As in the construction field, few, if any, courts have in recent years failed
to imply a warranty in landlord-tenant.
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with respect to landlord-tenant relations." This, coupled with
the Wyoming Supreme Court's view of caveat emptor in
Tavares, leads to the conclusion that caveat emptor should
have suffered two defeats by this decision. This conclusion
may be illustrated by supposing a builder had constructed
several new houses. He then sells one house to a buyer and
leases the second house to another party. If the septic system
of both homes fails, the buyer would be protected by Tavares.
The tenant should be equally protected from caveat emptor.
One obstacle to the death of caveat emptor in landlordtenant law is a Wyoming statute which disallows any implied
covenant in the conveyance of real estate, except in mineral
transactions. 2 The court ignored this statute in Tavares.
It is arguable that the Wyoming Supreme Court did not have
to deal with this statute since the land sale was separate
from and preceded the construction of the house. Nevertheless, the court could not mean that the holding of Tavares
only applies when the land sale and construction of the home
are separate. The cases interpreting this statute concern
covenants and not implied warranties. 3 It therefore should
be assumed that the court views this law as applying to
covenants and that the statute would not affect any landlordtenant cases involving warranties.
DEFENSES

Expirationof warranty: One defense raised in Tavares
was that the implied warranty on the septic system had
expired. 4 The court rejected this defense and held that the
duration of the warranty was to be determined by a reasonableness standard." Failure of the septic system after one
31. Pines v. Perssion, supra note 29, at 413. The court stated: "The need and
social desirability of adequate housing . . . is too important to be rebuffed
by that obnoxious cliche' caveat emptor."
32. WYo. STAT. § 34-36 (Supp. 1975).
33. Ayres Jewelry v. 0 & S Bldg., 419 P.2d 628, 632 (Wyo. 1966); Laramie
Printing Trustees v. Krueger, 437 P.2d 856, 860 (Wyo. 1968). These cases
concern specific provisions in the lease relating .to rent. A lease in Wyoming is not considered a conveyance of real estate unless its duration
exceeds three years. Wyo STAT. § 34-2 (Supp. 1975).
34. Tavares v. Horstman, supra note 1, at 1282.
35. Id. at 1282.
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year was not reasonable, resulting in continued application
of the warranty.
The reasonableness standard seems to be the accepted
standard in all other courts that have decided this issue."
The standard, wisely applied, will put different lengths of
warranties on different parts of the house. The court's
determination of reasonableness was based on the expected
minimum life of the defective part of the dwelling. 7 Tavares
does make expiration a valid defense and one of the few
ways for a builder to avoid the implied warranty. It would
be fair to infer that the warranty must clearly have expired
for a builder to be successful in using this defense.
Disclaimer of warranty: A builder may try to limit his
liability by disclaiming the implied warranty. One court has
already completely absolved a builder of liability 8 because
of a disclaimer, but other courts have wisely interpreted a
disclaimer strictly against the builder. In Smith v. Old Warson Development Co." the disclaimer was interpreted to mean
only that the builder would perform no additional work, but
would still be liable for work which was already completed.
Other uses of implied warranties may supply some guidelines
as to disclaimers, even though these uses are not applicable
to new house construction. The Uniform Commercial Code
in Section 2-316 ' 0 allows the disclaiming of warranties. This
provision is subject to Section 2-30241 of the code which invalidates any provision of a contract that is unconscionable. It
is very possible that any provision of a contract which totally
disclaims all warranties would be unconscionable if no substitute remedy was provided for. The Wyoming Mobile Home
36. Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., supra note 15, at 809; Padula v. J.J.
Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., supra note 15, at 532.
37. Tavares v. Horstman, supra note 1, at 1282.
38. Tibbita v. Openshaw, 18 Utah 2d 442, 425 P.2d 160 (1967).
39. Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., supra note 15, at 800; Wawak v. Stewart,
supra note 15, at 926. The Wawak court, as in Smith, discounted the disclaimer and allowed recovery under the warranty.
40. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316 (1972).
41. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 (1972).
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause
of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was
made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract....
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Act " declares that any disclaimer of an implied warranty
as to a new mobile home is void as against public policy.
The total disclaiming of the implied warranty should not
be allowed." The warranty has been imposed by law and the
builder should not be able to negate Tavares by a single sentence in the sales contract. A disclaimer of the warranty
would do nothing more than give the buyer a take-it or leaveit contract and thereby result in a return to caveat emptor.
Where a builder has used a disclaimer he should be obligated to provide an adequate substitute remedy that will
protect a buyer as well as the implied warranty does. Finally, even if a disclaimer would be allowed, it would not affect
the negligence remedy."4
CONCLUSION

The decision in Tavares places Wyoming with a growing minority of states that have discarded caveat emptor
in sales of new housing. The court properly recognized that
the common law doctrine of caveat emptor no longer serves
its purpose. The decision is sound in making the vendor-builder responsible for what he sells. While the court's holding
is limited to new housing, future application of Tavares will
hopefully extend implied warranties to the nonbuilder-vendor
and the subsequent purchaser. Other questions as to the
special situations in Wyoming and the impact of Tavares
on landlord-tenant can only be answered by the court. At the
very least, Tavares indicates a healthy and wise judicial concern for the homebuyers in Wyoming and, most importantly,
marks a partial death of the anachronism of caveat emptor.
JOHN BROOKS

42. WYo. STAT. § 35-551 (Supp. 1975).
43. A total disclaimer of warranty should be allowed if the ability to inspect
the premises and equal bargaining power is found by the court. This situation may be found in the rural circumstances referred to in the text.
44. The disclaimer of damages for personal injuries should always be found
unconscionable. This is in accord with UNIFORM COMMRCIAL CODE § 2-719
(1972).
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